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Assessing Managerial Power Theory:  
A Meta-Analytic Approach to Understanding the 
Determinants of CEO Compensation
Marc van Essen 
Utrecht University
Jordan Otten
Edward J. Carberry
Erasmus University
Although studies about the determinants of CEO compensation are ubiquitous, the balance of 
evidence for one of the more controversial theoretical approaches, managerial power theory, 
remains inconclusive. The authors provide a meta-analysis of 219 U.S.-based studies, focusing 
on the relationships between indicators of managerial power and levels of CEO compensation 
and CEO pay-performance sensitivities. The results indicate that managerial power theory is 
well equipped for predicting core compensation variables such as total cash and total 
compensation but less so for predicting the sensitivity of pay to performance. In most situations 
where CEOs are expected to have power over the pay setting process, they receive significantly 
higher levels of total cash and total compensation. In contrast, where boards are expected to 
have more power, CEOs receive lower total cash and total compensation. In addition, powerful 
directors also appear to be able to establish tighter links between CEO compensation and firm 
performance and can accomplish this even in the face of powerful CEOs. The authors discuss 
the implications for theory and research regarding the determinants of executive compensation.
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Although research on CEO compensation continues to proliferate (Barkema & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1988, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000), there remains a lack of interdisciplinary consensus regarding the primary 
forces shaping observable patterns of executive compensation. The lack of consensus is most 
visible between scholars in economics and finance who advocate for the primacy of market-
based explanations (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Zábojník, 
2004) and scholars outside of these two disciplines who have challenged these explanations 
and some of their underlying assumptions by highlighting the importance of power (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2004), social-psychological processes (O’Reilly & Main, 2010), and the institutional 
environment (Diprete, Eirich, & Pittinsky, 2010) in the creation of compensation practices. 
This division has generated much productive discussion, although it is but the latest 
manifestation of long-running debates between neoclassical and managerialist traditions 
examining executive compensation (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).
The most prominent recent challenger to purely market-based explanations is managerial 
power theory (MPT) advanced by Bebchuk and Fried (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Bebchuk, 
Fried, & Walker, 2002). At the core of this framework is a direct challenge to the common 
assumption within agency theory of optimal contracting, that is, that boards engage in 
arm’s-length transactions with executives over compensation arrangements and that such 
transactions help mitigate agency problems by creating compensation practices that more 
closely align the interests of executives and shareholders. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) argue that boards rarely engage in arm’s-length transactions because CEOs often 
have power over board members because of specific structural and social-psychological 
mechanisms that have an important influence over board-level decision-making processes 
about executive compensation. These mechanisms create few incentives for directors to 
challenge compensation arrangements that are more in the interest of executives than 
shareholders, that is, higher levels of compensation and compensation that is less sensitive 
to performance. The goal of MPT, however, is not to refute agency theory but to deepen it 
by arguing that managerial power and its influence on executive compensation cast doubt on 
the assumption of optimal contracting. According to MPT, managerial power over pay-setting 
processes results in executive compensation practices that often function not as solutions to 
agency problems within large publicly listed firms, as agency theorists have argued, but that 
are in fact manifestations of these problems.
Some scholars in finance and economics have, in turn, critiqued MPT, drawing on various 
types of evidence. First, these critiques have pointed to the simultaneous increase in CEO 
pay and independence of boards of directors during the 1990s as inconsistent with MPT. If 
boards were becoming more independent, these critics argue, MPT would predict that CEOs 
would have actually been less able to influence the pay-setting process and thus less able 
to realize increasing levels of pay (Conyon, 2006; Hall & Murphy, 2003; Murphy, 2002; 
Murphy & Zábojník, 2004). Second, critics of MPT have argued that the increase in both 
the hiring rate and pay levels of externally hired CEOs relative to internal candidates goes 
against MPT’s claim that incumbent CEOs have more power than externally hired CEOs 
(Hall & Murphy, 2003; Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004). Third, challengers to 
MPT have argued that the low incidence of indexed stock options can be attributed more to 
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their accounting treatment (at least before 2004) than to managers being able to use their 
power to negotiate for less risky and more accounting-friendly “plain vanilla” stock options 
(Conyon, 2006). Fourth and finally, recent critiques of MPT have pointed to other trends in 
executive compensation, such as aggregate-level associations between corporate performance 
and compensation as well as the shortening of CEO tenures over time, as evidence against 
MPT (Kaplan, 2008). Critics of MPT have used this evidence to claim that MPT is not 
supported by the empirical evidence (Murphy, 2002).
In assessing these critiques, it is clear that they raise important questions about the extent 
and influence of managerial power. However, they do not provide sufficient evidence to 
make definitive claims about the validity of MPT. Although Bebchuk and Fried (2004) have 
raised counterarguments to some of these critiques directly, a more fundamental point is that 
most of these challenges have not been based on direct tests of the relationship between 
indicators of managerial power and compensation outcomes at the firm level (although for 
important exceptions, see Conyon, 2006; Conyon & He, 2004). Instead, these critiques have 
tended to focus on aggregate-level trends relating to board independence, compensation, 
firm performance, and CEO turnover. We contend, however, that the two core questions for 
testing the validity of MPT should be the following: (a) Do CEOs who have more power 
over their boards have higher compensation levels than CEOs with less power? and (b) Do 
CEOs who have more power over directors have compensation that is less sensitive to firm 
performance than that of CEOs with less power? Analyzing aggregate-level trends is 
suggestive but does not provide sufficient evidence to rigorously evaluate these two 
questions.
Fortunately, a large and diverse number of studies have examined these relationships 
empirically at the firm level. The literature, however, remains inconclusive and is 
characterized by divergent and conflicting findings that have allowed both proponents and 
opponents of MPT to put forward evidence to support different claims (O’Reilly & Main, 
2010). For example, several studies find that CEO duality, a manifestation of CEO power, 
is related to higher pay (e.g., Yermack, 1996), whereas other studies find no such relationship 
between CEO duality and pay at all (e.g., Boyd, 1994). Therefore, what is needed at this 
stage is a more rigorous assessment of the existing literature, one that consolidates the mixed 
empirical findings and assesses the general explanatory validity of MPT regarding levels of 
compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance.
In this article, we offer both a consolidation and an assessment of this literature with 
the help of meta-analytic methods. Meta-analyses have become increasingly common in 
management research (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2011; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Deutsch, 2005; Heugens & Lander, 2009; Tosi 
et al., 2000) as a useful and robust way to analyze relationships between variables that have 
been examined in a large number of studies. Despite scores of empirical studies examining 
managerial power, the evidence and results remain subject to much ambiguity and 
controversy. In situations where there are large numbers of studies with mixed and 
conflicting findings, meta-analytic techniques can play an important role in providing a 
comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the balance of evidence with data that are 
closer to definitive than those reported in any single primary study (C. C. Miller & 
Cardinal, 1994).
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We use these techniques to assess the accumulated evidence of 219 studies that measure 
the influence of managerial power directly on both CEO compensation levels and the 
relationship between corporate performance and CEO pay. Since the vast majority of studies 
have focused on the United States, we limit our sample to this context. Although testing 
managerial power was not necessarily the primary focus of every study in our data set, all of 
them have examined relationships between specific variables that allow us to test MPT using 
meta-analytical techniques. In addition to providing a meta-analytic assessment of MPT, we 
update Tosi et al. (2000), the first meta-analysis of the executive compensation literature, 
which provided a key assessment of the effects of firm size and performance on CEO pay. 
Their study, however, focused on these two determinants of executive pay separately and 
did not examine the influence of corporate governance variables, such as board and firm 
ownership structures, that are indicators of the power of different actors over the pay-setting 
process. We specifically investigate the possible moderating effects of these variables on 
performance–pay relationships, which Tosi et al. (2000) indicated as missing components of 
their analysis. Furthermore, Tosi et al.’s (2000) study was conducted over a decade ago and 
included 42 studies. Our analysis includes 219.
In addition, this article extends the application of meta-analytical methodology for 
management and organizational research in three ways (Combs, Ketchen, Crook, & Roth, 
2011). First, our study is among the first in management research to use partial correlations 
as effect sizes (Carney et al., 2011). Using partial correlations allows us to incorporate 
studies from disciplinary domains such as finance and economics in which bivariate effect 
size information is not commonly reported and to control for the direction of causality 
between firm performance and CEO compensation (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 
2007). Moreover, we run bivariate and partial Hedges and Olkin–type meta-analyses 
(HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to assess the balance of evidence regarding the antecedent 
variables and different CEO pay components. A second extension is that we employ meta-
analytic regression analyses (MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) to model the moderating 
effects of a broad range of managerial power and control variables on the focal relationship 
between performance and pay (Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). Finally, we make use of 
meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM; Cheung & Chan, 2005) to test the 
direct effect of all indicators of power on the level of CEO compensation.
Ultimately, the primary goal of this article is to help advance the debate about MPT by 
using the methodological power of meta-analytical techniques to assess the accumulated 
evidence to date. Our goal is not to argue that finance and economics scholars have been 
wrong in their critiques of MPT but that their evidence does not go far enough in its 
assessment of MPT. We believe that testing MPT requires more rigorous analysis and that 
meta-analytic techniques provide a powerful set of tools that have yet to be used to assess 
MPT. Ultimately, such an assessment will help us assess whether and how MPT expands 
agency theory explanations of the antecedents of executive compensation.
Manifestations of Managerial Power
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that when CEOs have more power over the board of 
directors, they will be better positioned to negotiate for compensation arrangements that 
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serve their own interests, that is, they will be better able to negotiate for higher pay and pay 
that is less sensitive to their firm’s performance. This fundamental claim of MPT rests on 
a challenge to the common optimal contracting assumption within agency theory, which 
posits that managers and boards negotiate in arm’s-length transactions over compensation, 
with directors acting as selfless agents of shareholders and negotiating for compensation 
arrangements that serve the interests of shareholders rather than executives. However, if 
we assume self-interested behavior by executives, it is also logical to assume possible self-
interested behavior by directors, such that delegating decision-making responsibilities to 
boards of directors may also lead to agency problems between shareholders and the board.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) highlight a number of reasons why directors might not have 
the incentives to negotiate in the interests of shareholders and, in fact, may have incentives 
to go along with compensation arrangements that favor executives. First, since directors’ 
positions confer status, connections, and compensation, most directors will want to keep their 
positions and be reelected, and CEOs will exert a powerful influence over director selection 
(also see Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1995). Second, social and psychological mechanisms that 
have been found to be common within small groups, such as friendship, loyalty, and 
collegiality, are also common to boards and make directors less likely to challenge CEOs 
(O’Reilly & Main, 2010). Third, CEOs are in positions to reward directors directly through 
higher compensation, new business, and charitable contributions. These incentives make it 
likely that executives who wield power over board members will be better positioned to 
negotiate for compensation arrangements that are in their favor.
The recognition of such incentives challenges the assumption of arm’s-length transactions 
that represent the core insights of MPT. However, as Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and others 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009) have pointed out, MPT is in line with a long history of work 
stretching back to Berle and Means (1932) that has attended to the role of social and political 
forces in shaping executive compensation. Like earlier work, MPT has proven to be 
provocative and has generated a number of critics (e.g., Conyon, 2006; Kaplan, 2008; 
Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004). Although most of these critiques, as noted above, 
have not tested MPT directly by examining the firm-level relationships between managerial 
power compensation and performance, MPT provides a simple prediction that is empirically 
testable: If executives have more power over the board, they will have more power to 
influence the design of their compensation arrangements. Since executives prefer more 
compensation and less risky arrangements (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988), when they have 
power over the board we would expect executives to receive higher pay and pay that is less 
sensitive to performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). In addition, since social psychologists 
and sociologists have long viewed power as a relationship (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), MPT also leads to the opposite prediction: When boards have 
more power over CEOs, CEOs will have lower compensation and pay that is more sensitive 
to corporate performance.
Hence, the core prediction of MPT can be tested directly in two ways: by examining the 
power that a CEO has over the board and by examining the power that boards have over 
CEOs. If our analysis finds higher levels of pay and pay that is less sensitive to performance 
when executives have more power, and the opposite when directors have more power, this 
will provide empirical evidence in favor of MPT. To test these predictions, scholars have 
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relied on a number of different indicators of CEO and board power (Finkelstein et al., 2009), 
each of which has been linked to specific theoretical mechanisms. In this section, we 
hypothesize the primary ways in which managerial and board power manifests itself and can 
influence the level of executive compensation and its relationship with firm performance. 
We focus on the two sets of mechanisms on which researchers have focused most frequently 
when analyzing managerial power: board structures (Dalton et al., 1998; van Essen, van 
Oosterhout, & Carney, in press) and ownership characteristics (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & 
Roengpitya, 2003; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). We hypothesize that the effect that each 
mechanism will have on the ability of managers to receive both higher pay levels and pay 
that is less sensitive to firm performance.
Board Characteristics
Structural features of boards of directors can constrain or enable managerial power in 
the pay-setting process. The common agency theory assumption of optimal contracting 
sees boards as representatives of shareholders and therefore able and willing to monitor and 
constrain managerial power (e.g., Conyon & Peck, 1998; Finkelstein, 1992; Yermack, 1996). 
Managerial power theorists, however, have challenged this assumption that boards of 
directors engage in arm’s-length transactions in which they will act as selfless agents of 
shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). A more nuanced view would be that under certain 
conditions boards will be more or less influenced by executives and hence more or less able 
to constrain executive power in the compensation-setting process. We focus on four firm-
level characteristics that allow us to predict when directors will be more or less influenced 
by CEOs and consequently be less or more able to constrain managerial power: CEO duality, 
CEO tenure, size of the board, and the percentage of independent directors.
A key structural governance feature is CEO duality, in which an individual has the roles 
of both CEO and board chairman. MPT predicts that the concentration of decision-making 
power in one individual leads to more power, for several possible reasons (Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994). First, since the CEO–chairman is responsible for organizing board meetings 
and setting the agendas of these meetings, the CEO–chairman is able to control the 
information provided to the board of directors (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Pearce & Zahra, 
1991). Second, CEO duality increases the CEO’s influence over the nomination process of 
new directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Third, the dual role of CEO and chairman can be 
considered as the highest rank in the corporate hierarchy. This figurehead status, with more 
mandate and power, can lead to more influence over the pay setting process (Ungson & 
Steers, 1984). We therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 1a: CEO duality is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.
Hypothesis 1b: In the presence of CEO duality, the association between corporate performance and 
CEO compensation will be weaker.
The length of a CEO’s tenure is also likely to be an important determinant of managerial 
power. Longer tenured CEOs can be expected to have more influence over board members 
and their decisions because they have more status and more experience with the company 
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and its board (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, 2006). The collaboration among board members and 
bonds of collegiality intensify over time, and CEOs with longer tenure have more time to 
influence this process (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Macey, 2008). CEOs with longer tenure can 
also be more influential over the remuneration committee directly. Evidence pointing in this 
direction shows that remuneration committees whose chairs have been installed later than the 
CEO tend to pay more (Main et al., 1995). Furthermore, other research has found that the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO pay weakens as tenure increases (Hill & 
Phan, 1991). CEOs with longer tenure are therefore expected to have more power, and 
therefore we hypothesize,
Hypothesis 2a: CEO tenure is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.
Hypothesis 2b: In the presence of CEOs with longer tenure, the association between corporate 
performance and CEO compensation will be weaker.
The size of the board in terms of the number of directors is also likely to enable or constrain 
managerial power. Although monitoring requires capacity, large boards can be ineffective at 
constraining managerial power because larger boards require more time and effort to build 
consensus and generate the social cohesion of smaller boards (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In 
addition, larger boards can become ineffective because of internal coordination and 
communication problems (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Therefore, the in-group monitoring and 
collective action problems of larger boards may provide executives with more power over 
the pay-setting process (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; O’Reilly & Main, 2010; 
Pfeffer, 1972; Yermack, 1996). We therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 3a: Board size is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.
Hypothesis 3b: In the presence of larger boards, the association between corporate performance and 
CEO compensation will be weaker.
Finally, the composition of the board in terms of the percentage of independent directors 
may also influence managerial power. Directors are considered independent if they are not 
currently or have never been employees of the company and have no other relationship with 
the firm, such as business contracts (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Agency theorists have argued 
that boards should be composed of independent directors (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) who are 
less sensitive to the influence of corporate insiders and free of conflicts of interest (Dalton 
et al., 1998). In turn, this provides them with an incentive to protect their own reputations as 
expert independent decision makers and focus on improving corporate performance (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). However, MPT has highlighted a number of ways that independent 
directors can actually lose independence and become vulnerable to managerial influence, 
such as the role of CEOs in director selection, the close connections and bonds of shared 
interests and collegiality among board members, and the dependence of independent 
directors on managers for information (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Moreover, the collaboration 
among independent board members and managers may intensify over time (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2004; Macey, 2008). In such situations, independent directors can become less willing 
to challenge executive compensation arrangements. Nevertheless, we expect independent 
directors in general to be better able to constrain executive power as opposed to directors 
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who have been executives of the firms themselves or have some other relationship with the 
firm. We therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 4a: The percentage of independent directors is negatively associated with the value of 
total CEO compensation.
Hypothesis 4b: At higher levels of board independence, the relationship between corporate 
performance and CEO compensation will be stronger.
Ownership Characteristics
Both MPT and agency theory argue that the ownership structure of the corporation can 
enable or constrain the power of CEOs (Tosi et al., 2000). For example, large, concentrated 
owners often have both the means and incentives to monitor management effectively 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986, 1997). More specifically, since these 
owners have large investment stakes, they are more dependent on the performance of the 
firm. In addition, large owners are more able to protect their interests by means of both 
formal influence, such as the nomination of and voting for directors, and informal 
communication with management (Smith, 1996). In contrast, for dispersed shareholders, who 
own only a small percentage of a firm, the costs of close monitoring may be too high relative 
to the possible gains produced by such monitoring. Instead of trying to steer managerial 
decisions directly, these shareholders are more inclined to “vote with their feet” and sell their 
shares if they disagree with executives or when the firm’s performance falls below 
expectations (Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009; Hirschman, 1970). Moreover, 
dispersed shareholders are likely to have dispersed strategies and goals for increasing firm 
value, leaving management with more influence to make their own calls (Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000). Earlier studies have also shown that the level of executive compensation is 
negatively associated with block holders who have holdings of 5% or more (e.g., Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Khan, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005; Lambert, Larcker, & 
Weigelt, 1993; Mehran, 1995). The association between performance and pay (i.e., 
performance–pay sensitivity) is also more likely to be stronger at higher levels of concentrated 
ownership as these owners are expected to monitor management more closely and ensure 
executives make value-enhancing decisions (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986, 1997). We therefore expect that corporations with more concentrated ownership 
structures will be better able to constrain managerial power and hypothesize,
Hypothesis 5a: Higher levels of concentrated ownership is negatively associated with the value of 
total CEO compensation.
Hypothesis 5b: At higher levels of concentrated ownership, the association between corporate 
performance and CEO compensation will be stronger.
In addition to the concentration of ownership, the identity of a firm’s owners can also 
constrain or enable managerial power over executive compensation practices. For example, 
one of the most important governance changes in the past 20 years has been the dramatic 
increase in the holdings and number of institutional investors (Useem, 1996). Although their 
status as institutional investors does not give them more formal power than other investors, 
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they often have substantial holdings and fiduciary obligations to their investors to improve 
the returns to their clients. Therefore, institutional investors tend to more actively monitor 
management than individual investors and may be more able to constrain executive power 
in setting compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Hartzell 
& Starks, 2003). We therefore predict that institutional investors will act more often as a 
constraint on, instead of an enabler of, managerial power and hypothesize,
Hypothesis 6a: Higher levels of institutional ownership is negatively associated with the value of 
total CEO compensation.
Hypothesis 6b: At higher levels of institutional ownership, the association between corporate 
performance and CEO compensation will be stronger.
Method and Data
Sample and Coding
To identify the population of studies on CEO compensation in the U.S. context, we used 
five complementary search strategies (Heugens et al., 2009). First, we consulted several 
review articles (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & 
Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999) and two published meta-analyses (Deutsch, 2005; Tosi et al., 
2000). Second, we located additional articles using five electronic databases, (a) ABI/INFORM 
Global, (b) EconLit, (c) Google Scholar, (d) JSTOR, and (e) SSRN, and the following search 
terms: bonus, compensation, incentive, long-term incentive plan (LTIP), pay, remuneration, 
salary, and stock option. Third, we conducted a manual search of 25 journals in the fields 
of accounting, economics, finance, and management. Fourth, after collecting an initial set 
of studies, we traced backward all references reported in the articles and traced forward all 
articles that cited the original articles using Google Scholar. Fifth, we corresponded with 82 
researchers who had previously written one or several articles on the focal relationship in 
which effect size information was not reported or whose studies we could not retrieve, 
asking them for a correlation table and regression output. This strategy yielded a final 
sample of 219 primary studies, which consisted of 169 journal articles, 47 working papers, 
and 3 doctoral dissertations (see Appendix A).
In terms of samples used in the studies that we analyzed (see Table 1), about one third 
(32.42%) relied on an index from Standard and Poor’s (S&P). In our sample, 8.22% of the 
studies used the S&P 500, 10.96% used the S&P 1500, and 13.24% of the studies indicated 
that they used the S&P but did not specify which particular index. Another one quarter of the 
studies (26.94%) analyzed samples based on lists published in Forbes, Fortune, or Business 
Week. The Fortune 500 comprises the 500 largest firms traded on U.S. stock exchanges in 
terms of revenues, and although Forbes and Business Week have published different lists 
over the past 20 years, they primarily include the largest publicly traded companies. Another 
one quarter (26.48%) of the studies did not specify their samples, whereas the remainder used 
a mix of samples (7.31%) or some other sample (6.85%). Hence, despite the accessibility of 
the ExecuComp database, which is based on the S&P 1500, only a little more than one third 
of the studies used it as their only sample. Nevertheless, a majority of the studies have been 
based on large, publicly traded companies.
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Table 1 
Data Sources, Industries, and Sample Periods of Primary Studies
Category % Of Total Number Of Studies
Index Used For Study Sample
S&P 32.42%
Forbes 11.87%
Fortune 10.96%
Business Week 4.11%
Other single index 6.85%
Mixed 7.31%
Not specified/ No specific index 26.48%
Source Compensation Data
Execucomp 36.99 %
Proxy statements 30.14 %
Forbes 9.59 %
Business Week 2.74 %
Individual Survey 1.83 %
Other single data sources 2.28 %
Mixed Execucomp & proxy statements 5.48 %
Mixed Forbes & proxy statements 0.91 %
Mixed Forbes & Execucomp 0.91 %
Mixed Forbes & Fortune 0.91 %
Mixed other combinations 6.85 %
Not specified 1.37 %
Industry
Airline 0.91%
Banking & Financial services 6.85 %
Computer software 0.46 %
Electric 0.46 %
Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals 2.28 %
Leisure 0.91 %
Oil & Gas 0.46 %
Real estate 1.83 %
Retail 0.46 %
Mixed (studies with at least 4 different industries) 85.39 %
Number Of Years Covered In Study Sample
Years  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 >15
Articles 34 18 22 20 20 25 17 10 7 14   6   8   5   2   3     8
Number Of Samples Per Time Period
 ≤/ 
1965
1966/ 
1970
1971/ 
1975
1976/ 
1980
1981/ 
1985
1986/ 
1990
1991/ 
1995
1996/ 
2000
2001/ 
2005
2006 / 
Samples started  
in period
4 4 6 15 20 33 87 35 14 1
Samples ended  
in period
1 1 3 4 12 33 40 64 58 3
Samples covering  
period
4 7 12 24 40 61 115 110 61 3
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Table 1 also reports the frequency of the data sources used in the primary studies. More 
than one third of our sample (36.99%) collected data from ExecuComp, which itself collects 
data from publicly available proxy statements. Another 30% of the studies in our sample 
used proxy statements, and about 13% of our sample used data published by Forbes or 
Business Week. Since these periodicals also draw on proxy statements, the vast majority 
of the studies in our sample relied on publicly available information about executive 
compensation available through proxy statements. Few researchers surveyed companies 
directly (1.83%). In terms of industries sampled, 85% of the studies in our sample analyze 
four or more industries. Finally, as can be seen in Table 1, the primary studies included in 
our analyses covered different, but sometimes overlapping, time periods, with most studies 
beginning between 1991 and 1995 and ending between 1996 and 2000.
After reading the articles, we developed a coding protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) for 
extracting data on relevant variables. Table 2 provides a description of the variables collected 
from the primary studies that are included in our meta-analyses. The coding protocol 
allowed us to differentiate between two types of firm financial performance, accounting 
performance and market performance, and among the most frequently used measures of 
CEO compensation, including salary, cash bonus, total cash (i.e., the sum of salary and cash 
bonus), LTIPs, and total compensation. LTIPs include long-term equity-based compensation 
(stock options, restricted stock units, and other long-term compensation) earned by the CEO 
during the year (e.g., Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).
For testing Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a, we collected effect size information for 
all the variables predicted to influence CEO total compensation and the interrelationships 
among all dependent, independent, and control variables used in our analyses. More 
specifically, we collected Pearson product–moment correlations coefficients (r) and sample 
sizes among all the variables. To test Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, and 6b, we used partial 
correlation coefficients (rxy.z) between firm performance and CEO total compensation. We 
computed these from the multivariate t statistics and degrees of freedom of the sampled 
regression analyses. To test our hypotheses, we also collected information about the study 
characteristics, methodological artifacts, and whether a particular variable was included in a 
study’s regression model. This allowed us to test the impact of these characteristics on the 
strength of the performance to pay relationship (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, & Parzan, in press; 
Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008).
One author coded all effect sizes. To assess agreement in extracting information from 
primary studies, another author independently coded a subsample of 512 randomly selected 
effect sizes. We then computed the percentage agreement and a chance agreement-corrected 
measure of reliability (Cohen’s kappa coefficient; Cohen, 1960). The percentage agreement 
and kappa value we obtained were .93 and .90, respectively, signifying a very high degree 
of reliability.
MASEM Procedure
We used MASEM (Cheung & Chan, 2005) to test Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a. 
The MASEM procedure combines the techniques of structural equation modeling with those 
of meta-analysis (Cheung & Chan, 2005). The technique is ideally suited to test these 
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(continued)
Table 2
Description of Variables
Variable Description
CEO salary Measures the annual base salary earned by the CEO during the year (e.g., Khan, 
Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005)
CEO cash bonus Measures the annual cash bonus earned by the CEO during the year (e.g., Gray & 
Cannella, 1997)
CEO total cash Measures the annual total cash earned by the CEO during the year, defined as the 
sum of salary and cash bonus (e.g., Nourayi & Mintz, 2008)
CEO long-term incentive  
plan (LTIP)
Measures long-term equity-based compensation (stock options, restricted stock, and 
other long-term compensation) earned by the CEO during the year (e.g., Balkin, 
Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000)
CEO total pay Measures the total annual compensation of the CEO; CEO total pay is the sum of 
total salary, cash bonus, and long-term compensation (grants of restricted stock, 
stock options, stock appreciation rights, and performance plans) in a year (e.g., 
David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998)
Firm performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm, including both accounting-
based measures and market-based measures of firm value
Accounting performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is expressed in the form 
of an accounting-based measure of firm profits (return on assets, return on equity, 
earnings per share, and profit margin [PM])
Market performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm that is expressed in the form 
of a market-based measure of firm value (stock returns, market to book [MB], 
Tobin’s Q)
CEO duality Measures whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors (e.g., 
Grossman & Cannella, 2006)
CEO tenure CEO tenure is operationalized as the number of years the executive has been CEO 
(e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989)
Board size Measures total numbers of directors who serve on the board (e.g., Staw & Epstein, 
2000)
Board independence A variable that reflects the degree to which the board of directors operates independently 
from corporate insiders, commonly measured as the ratio of outside board members to 
the total number of board members (e.g., Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009)
Ownership concentration Measures the extent to which the firm’s outstanding stock is in the hands of large 
block holders and reflects the percentage of the firm’s ownership held by those who 
own at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares (e.g., Grossman & Cannella, 2006)
Institutional ownership This variable represents the equity position held by all institutional investors and 
assumes a positive value (either 1 in the case of dummy operationalizations or a 
percentage in case the degree of institutional owners is known) when the owner is 
an institutional investor (e.g., public or company pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance services; e.g., David et al., 1998)
Firm size An indicator of the size of the firm, commonly measured as a firm’s total assets, 
sales, or employees (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989)
Firm debt A variable that reflects the degree of leverage of the firm, commonly measured as 
ratio of total debts to total assets (e.g., Grossman & Cannella, 2006)
Firm diversification A variable that reflects the degree to which firms are simultaneously active in many 
different businesses (entropy index, Herfindahl index, or number of segments; 
e.g., Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001)
Firm risk A variable that reflects the degree to which the financial valuation of a firm’s stock 
varies in relation to movements of the broader market; a commonly used measure 
of such risk is the beta of a firm’s stock, computed by regressing a firm’s monthly 
stock return on the corresponding country’s market index return (e.g., J. S. Miller, 
Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2002)
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Variable Description
Firm R&D A variable that reflects the degree of R&D expenditures of the firm, commonly 
measured as the ratio of research and development expenditure to total sales (e.g., 
Carpenter et al., 2001)
CEO age Measured as the number of years (e.g., Attaway, 2000)
Inside ownership Measures the extent to which a firm’s outstanding stock is in the hands of directors 
and officers (e.g., Grossman & Cannella, 2006)
Table 2 (continued)
hypotheses because it allows us to analyze the direct effect of our indicators of managerial 
and director power on CEO total compensation. We used MASEM to avoid biased estimates 
resulting from possible correlations among independent variables. This can be a problem if 
the standard HOMA approach (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) is used by itself. We conducted our 
structural equation modeling by using a two-stage procedure (Carney et al., 2011).
In the first stage, we used HOMA to compute the meta-analytic Pearson product–moment 
correlation (r) between independent and dependent variables as well as the corresponding 
confidence interval. This produced a meta-analytic correlation table. Since HOMA procedures 
assume that effect sizes are normally distributed, we used Fisher’s (1928) Zr transformation 
to correct for possible skewness in the effect size distribution (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).1 In 
line with current conventions among meta-analytic researchers, we used random effects 
HOMA for combining study estimates (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009).2 
To estimate the mean effect size appropriately, differences in precision across effect sizes 
had to be accounted for, so we weighted effect sizes by their inverse variance weight (w), 
that is, the inverse of their squared standard error (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).3 We also used 
these weights to calculate the standard error of the mean effect size and its confidence 
interval.4
In the second stage, this meta-analytic correlation matrix was treated as the observed 
correlation matrix and subjected to regular maximum likelihood structural equation modeling 
routines to test the aforementioned hypotheses (Cheung & Chan, 2005). In this procedure, 
the harmonic mean number of observations from all studies was treated as the number of 
observations. In this way, correct and conservative t values for the model parameters were 
estimated (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). The data were analyzed using the full 
information maximum likelihood method with the LISREL 8.80 software package.
MARA Procedure
We tested Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, and 6b using MARA (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
In our MARA analyses, the dependent variable is neither pay nor performance but an 
estimate of the associational strength of the focal relationship (i.e., the relationship between 
performance and pay) in a given sample. We use partial correlation coefficients (rxy.z) as our 
effect size estimates for the MARA procedure, and in our case it captures the association 
between firm performance and CEO total compensation, given a set of n control variables. 
 at Erasmus Univ Rotterdam on November 27, 2012jom.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
14   Journal of Management / Month XXXX
It can be computed from the t statistics and degrees of freedom reported in primary studies 
(Greene, 2008).5 Similar to multiple regression approaches, MARA analyses construct a 
linear regression model involving a set of predictors, which in this case are the potential 
moderators of the performance–pay relationship (i.e., managerial power variables and our 
control variables) on the dependent variable (i.e., the effect size). We weighted these effect 
sizes by their inverse variance weight to account for differences in the precision of the 
information contained in them (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Wright, in press). In other words, 
the primary-level study effect sizes are regressed onto a set of predictors (i.e., moderators) of 
the performance–pay relationship (Carney et al., 2011; Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008; 
Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Stanley & Jarrell, 2005). Following current standards in the meta-
analytic literature (Geyskens et al., 2009), we used random effects estimation methods in 
our MARA analyses, which are more conservative than conventional fixed effects methods. 
Specifically, this yielded the following regression equation,
Ri = y0 + ymDi + bmSi + jRI + ui
where Ri is the partial correlation between firm performance and CEO total compensation, 
y0 is the constant term, D is a vector of whether a particular variable is included in a 
regression or not, S is a vector of measurement artifacts, R is a vector of study characteristics, 
and ui is the random component.
To test the moderating effects of the indicators of CEO and board power on the 
performance–pay relationship, we included in the D vector a set of dummy variables indicating 
whether the following variables were included in the regression (0) or not (1): CEO duality, 
CEO tenure, board size, board independence, ownership concentration, and institutional 
ownership. We also included dummy variables indicating whether the following control 
variables were included in the regression (0) or not (1): firm size, firm risk, firm diversification, 
firm R&D level, firm debt level, CEO age, and inside ownership.
To control for the influence of measurement artifacts on effect sizes, we included in the 
S vector several control variables. More specifically, to test for the moderating effect of focal 
variable operationalizations, we added dummy variables indicating whether firm performance 
was measured as accounting (1) or as market (0) performance and whether the effect size was 
derived from a study investigating changes in performance and changes in compensation (1) 
or was derived from a study investigating absolute levels of performance and compensation 
(0). To test for the moderating effect of methodological artifacts, we included a dummy 
variable indicating whether a given effect size was based on panel (1) or cross-sectional 
(0) data. We also included a dummy variable coded as (1) when an effect size was derived 
from a study controlling for the possible endogeneity of firm performance on executive 
compensation and as (0) otherwise.6 In addition, we controlled for the number of variables in 
the regression and whether a study controlled for year and industry effects. To control for the 
influence of study artifacts, we included in the R vector three other control variables. To test 
for the “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979), we included a dummy variable denoting 
whether a study was published (1) or not (0). To control for the possibility that the focal 
relationship weakened or strengthened over time (Gregg, Machin, & Szymanski, 1993), we 
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added the median year of the sample window. Finally, we included each publication’s 5-year 
ISI impact factor to control for publication outlet status effects (Carney et al., 2011).
Results
CEO Total Compensation
Tables 3 and 4 report the results pertaining to Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a. 
Table 3 depicts the meta-analytic correlation matrix. The cells below the diagonal represent 
105 separate HOMA meta-analyses and report the meta-analytic mean correlation for each 
relationship, which we use to run the MASEM analyses. Above-diagonal cells report the 
number of observations (N) and the number of samples (k) on which the meta-analytic mean 
is based. Table 4 contains MASEM results. The model fits the data well (c2 = 1,205.77, 
root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .09, root mean square residual 
[RMSR] = .03).
Hypothesis 1a, which predicts that CEO duality is positively related to the level of total 
CEO compensation, is confirmed by the results in Table 4. We find that CEO duality is 
positively related to CEO total pay (b = .02, p < .05). We find no support for Hypothesis 2a 
that CEO tenure is positively related to CEO compensation levels (b = –.00, p > .05). We 
find clear support for Hypothesis 3a, as the size of boards is associated with higher levels of 
total pay (b = .12, p < .01). In fact, after firm size, board size has the largest impact on total 
pay. In contrast to the prediction of Hypothesis 4a, the degree of board independence is 
positively related to total pay levels (b = .06, p < .01). Our findings also provide support for 
Hypothesis 5a: As hypothesized, concentrated ownership is negatively related to the level of 
total CEO compensation (b = –.04, p < .01). Finally, we find support for Hypothesis 6a that 
the presence of higher levels of institutional ownership is associated with lower levels of 
total pay (b = –.03, p < .01).
Table 4 also reports the results for the control variables. We find that firm performance 
(b = .12, p < .01), firm size (b = .28, p < .01), firm diversification (b = .02, p < .05), firm 
risk (b = .11, p < .01), and firm R&D level (b = .03, p < .01) are all positively related to total 
CEO compensation. However, firm debt level (b = –.10, p < .01), CEO age (b = –.06, p < 
.01), and inside ownership (b = –.02, p < .05) are all negatively related to total pay levels. 
The results confirm previous research that firm size is the most important antecedent 
variable to explain CEO total compensation (Tosi et al., 2000).
In Appendices B, C, and D we report the HOMA results of the levels of both total CEO 
compensation and a breakdown of the levels of other pay components of CEO compensation 
(i.e., salary, cash bonus, total cash, and LTIPs) in relationship to board and CEO characteristics 
(Appendix B), ownership concentration and institutional ownership (Appendix C), and firm 
performance (Appendix D). We present the HOMA results in two panels. Panel 1 contains a 
set of r-based HOMA results (Pearson product–moment correlations), and Panel 2 contains 
the corresponding rxy.z-based HOMA findings (partial correlations). In addition to the meta-
analytic mean (M), we report the number of samples (k), the total sample size (N), the 
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Table 4
Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Modeling Results
CEO Total Pay
Predictor b t
CEO duality .02* 1.82
CEO tenure –.00 –0.29
Board size .12** 14.46
Board independence .06** 3.09
Ownership concentration –.04** –4.24
Institutional ownership –.03** –3.69
Firm performance .12** 15.68
Firm size .28** 33.76
Firm debt level –.10** –10.23
Firm diversification .02* 2.10
Firm risk .11** 13.97
Firm R&D level .03** 3.21
CEO age –.06** –7.88
Inside ownership –.02* –2.23
Harmonic mean N 14,349
c2 1,205.77
RMSEA .09
RMSR .03
*p < .05. **p < .01.
standard error of the mean effect size (SE), Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic (Q test),7 
and the explained variance (EV). When a blank line appears in a table, it is because there 
were not enough effect sizes available to estimate the particular relationship. In addition to 
these results, we ran different robustness checks (not reported) on subsets of our data to 
investigate possible time and primary study sampling effects. These tests revealed similar 
results as the results reported here.8
Performance–Pay Sensitivity
Table 5 presents the MARA results, which relate to Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, and 6b. 
In the MARA analyses, the dependent variable is neither pay nor performance but the partial 
correlation between firm performance and CEO total compensation. We report in Table 5 the 
effect of studies that fail to control for each specific indicator of CEO or board power relative 
to those studies that do control for a specific indicator. For example, some studies do not 
control for board independence in their regression analyses whereas others do. Therefore, 
if we report a positive and significant coefficient for a variable, this indicates that studies 
that did not include this variable reported a stronger relationship between firm performance 
and CEO total compensation than studies that did control for the variable. Hence, this 
variable has a positive moderation effect on the focal relationship. We also analyzed the 
effects of a number of control variables in the same way. Overall, the model fits the data 
reasonably well (R2 = .27).
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The MARA results, as reported in Table 5, do not provide support for Hypothesis 1b. 
CEO duality has no significant moderating effect on the performance–pay relationship. We 
find support for Hypothesis 2b, which predicts that the presence of CEOs with longer tenure 
negatively moderates the performance–pay relationship. The results show that studies that 
fail to control for CEO tenure in their regression analyses find a weaker performance–pay 
relationship (Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). Hence, in the presence of CEOs with 
Table 5
MARA Partial Correlation Coefficient Resultsa, b
Variable Model (1)
Managerial power indicators
CEO duality 0.00 (0.01)
CEO tenure -0.04 (0.01)**
Board size 0.06 (0.02)**
Board independence 0.03 (0.01)**
Ownership concentration 0.01 (0.01)
Institutional ownership 0.03 (0.01)*
Control variables
Firm size 0.03 (0.01)*
Firm risk 0.01 (0.01)
Firm diversification 0.03 (0.02)
Firm R&D level 0.02 (0.02)
Firm debt level -0.02 (0.02)
CEO age 0.01 (0.01)
Inside ownership -0.02 (0.01)
Focal variable operational
Accounting performance -0.07 (0.01)**
Change variables used -0.04 (0.01)**
Methodological artifacts
Panel design -0.01 (0.01)
Endogeneity check 0.00 (0.00)
Number of variables in regression 0.00 (0.00)
Control year effect 0.02 (0.01)*
Control industry effect -0.04 (0.01)**
Study artifacts
Published 0.03 (0.01)*
Median year sample window -0.00 (0.00)
Five-year ISI impact factor 0.00 (0.00)
R2 0.27
K 554
QModel (p) 244.86 (0.00)**
QResidual (p) 673.89 (0.00)**
V 0.00391
aUnstandardized regression coefficients are presented for study moderators and substantive moderators with stan-
dard errors in parentheses. k is the total number of effect sizes; Q is the homogeneity statistic with its probability in 
parentheses; v is the random effects variance component.
b * p < .05 ** p < .01.
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longer tenure, the association between firm performance and CEO compensation becomes 
weaker. In contrast to Hypothesis 3b, we find that in the presence of larger boards, the 
association between firm performance and CEO compensation actually becomes stronger. 
We find support for Hypothesis 4, that board independence positively moderates the 
performance–pay relationship. However, we find no moderating effect of ownership 
concentration on the performance–pay relationship, as hypothesized by Hypothesis 5b. 
Finally, we find support for Hypothesis 6b, as institutional ownership positively moderates 
the performance–pay relationship.
In terms of our control variables, the only significant finding was a positive effect for the 
firm size variable, which suggests that firm size positively moderates the performance–pay 
relationship. In terms of the indicators that measure the operationalizations of specific 
variables, we find a negative significant result for compensation changes to performance 
changes, which indicates that studies using absolute levels of compensation tend to identify 
stronger performance–pay relationships than those using changes in the levels of performance 
and compensation. We also find a negative effect for accounting performance, implying that 
studies that use accounting-based measures tend to find weaker performance–pay relationships 
than studies that use market-based measures as indicators for firm performance. Of the 
methodological moderators, our findings suggest that studies that control for the effects of 
time show stronger associations between firm performance and CEO compensation and 
studies that control for industry effects tend to find weaker associations. Finally, in terms of 
study artifacts, the significant positive effect for the published variable indicates that the “file 
drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979) is present in the executive pay field, implying that 
studies reporting greater effects have a better chance of being published.
As a robustness check of the MARA results, we examined the effects of the indicators of 
CEO and board power on the proportion of LTIPs to total compensation using the HOMA 
procedure. Examining the proportion of LTIPs relative to total compensation serves as a 
robustness check for our analyses of performance–pay sensitivities because LTIPs are 
usually based on firm performance. Therefore, the proportion of LTIPs to total compensation 
can be seen as an indicator of how performance and total pay are linked. Similar to the 
performance–pay sensitivities analyzed in the MARA results, we expect that more powerful 
CEOs will have a lower proportion of LTIPs to total compensation. In contrast, we expect 
that stronger boards will be associated with higher proportions of LTIPs. Appendix E 
presents the HOMA results, and as expected, they are identical to those of the MARA results 
in terms of their direction and statistical significance.
Discussion
Over the past decade, MPT has generated productive debates about the determinants of 
executive compensation by challenging the core assumption of agency theory that executive 
pay is set through arm’s-length contracting between executives and boards of directors 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Although MPT has been provocative, the empirical evidence has 
been mixed, allowing both proponents and opponents of MPT to argue in favor of and against 
it (O’Reilly & Main, 2010). In this article, we used a range of meta-analytic techniques to 
consolidate the often mixed empirical findings of 219 studies and provide a more definitive 
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Table 6
Summary of Predictions and Results
Total Pay
Performance–Pay 
Sensitivity
Indicator of Power Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
CEO duality (Hypothesis 1) + + – ns
CEO tenure (Hypothesis 2) + ns – –
Board size (Hypothesis 3) + + – +
Board independence (Hypothesis 4) – + + +
Ownership concentration (Hypothesis 5) – – + ns
Institutional ownership (Hypothesis 6) – – + +
assessment than those reported in any single primary study (C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994). 
In this section, we describe the contributions of our study and discuss avenues for future 
research.
Implications for Managerial Power Theory
Our tests of MPT focused on examining firm-level relationships between six different 
measures of managerial power and two outcomes: CEO total compensation levels and 
performance–pay sensitivities. We find support for MPT, but our findings do not allow us to 
say unequivocally that MPT holds across all conditions. Table 6 summarizes our predictions 
and findings.
In assessing the evidence regarding the relationship between managerial power and total 
compensation levels, we find overall support for MPT. Two of the three indicators of CEO 
power (board size and CEO duality) are positively associated with total pay, suggesting that 
in most situations where CEOs are expected to have more power over the pay setting 
process, they have higher levels of total compensation. Similarly, two out of the three 
indicators of board power (ownership concentration and institutional ownership) are 
negatively associated with total pay, suggesting that in most situations where boards have 
more power over the pay setting process, CEOs have lower total compensation. The two 
exceptions to these patterns are that board independence is positively associated with total 
compensation and the effect of CEO tenure is not significantly related to total compensation.
The results for performance–pay sensitivities provide less support for MPT. Only one 
of the indicators of CEO power (CEO tenure) is statistically significant and in the expected 
negative direction, whereas CEO duality is not significant, and board size is significant but 
in the opposite (positive) direction. However, two out the three indicators of board power 
(board independence and institutional ownership) are significant and in the expected 
positive direction, but ownership concentration is not significant. These results suggest 
that MPT is better able to explain total pay levels than performance–pay sensitivities. They 
further suggest that even powerful CEOs have a difficult time mitigating the performance–
pay link.
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Our total compensation measure may, however, obscure variation in the effects of the 
indictors of CEO and director power on different forms of compensation. For example, since 
CEOs may, like most employees, tend to prefer less risky forms of compensation, it is likely 
that powerful CEOs will have higher levels of cash compensation and have less pay at risk, 
such as LTIPs (Conyon & Murphy, 2000). To further examine the ability of MPT to account 
for the influence of CEO and board power on the level of different types of executive 
compensation, we ran additional MASEM models with the value of total cash compensation 
and LTIPs as dependent variables (see Appendix F). We find that all three of the indicators 
of CEO power are associated with higher levels of total cash compensation, whereas only 
one of the indicators of board power (ownership concentration) is associated with lower 
levels of total cash compensation. Two other indicators of board power, board independence 
and institutional ownership, are insignificantly related. Turning to LTIPs, the results reveal 
that two out of the three indicators of board power (ownership concentration and institutional 
ownership) are associated with higher levels of LTIPs, whereas board independence is 
negatively related. Two out of three indicators of CEO power (board size and CEO duality) 
are also associated with higher levels LTIPs, whereas CEO tenure is negatively related. These 
results suggest that powerful CEOs have more influence over setting cash compensation 
levels (even over more powerful boards) and powerful boards have more influence over 
linking pay to performance (even over powerful CEOs). These supplementary results suggest 
a more nuanced version of MPT in which different types of actors are able to use their power 
to influence different types of executive compensation outcomes.
Overall, the meta-analytic evidence reveals that MPT is well equipped for explaining 
levels of total cash and total compensation but less so for explaining pay at risk and 
performance–pay sensitivity. Although powerful CEOs seem well positioned to realize higher 
levels of cash compensation, powerful directors seem to be able to negotiate for higher levels 
of pay at risk and tighter links between firm performance and CEO compensation. Moreover, 
the findings suggest that directors can realize these preferences even in the face of powerful 
CEOs. This is contrary to what MPT predicts and is evidence that executives are not able to 
use their power unilaterally to influence all outcomes in their favor.
One possible explanation for director power with respect to pay at risk lies in the broader 
acceptance of the practice of linking pay to performance that emerged during the 1990s, the 
sample period of most of the studies in our meta-analyses. During this period, LTIPs were 
increasingly considered more appropriate by shareholders, who became more interested in 
making links between performance and pay (Zajac & Westphal, 2004), and even among 
some executives who saw them as another potential mechanism of wealth generation 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). The institutionalization of practices such as stock options and 
other forms of LTIPs during this period might have provided directors a solid foundation 
from which to negotiate, even in the face of powerful CEOs.
An alternative explanation for why we did not find a negative effect of our CEO power 
indicators on performance–pay sensitivities is that the incentives of directors and CEOs for 
performance–pay relationships may have actually been aligned, that is, some CEOs may 
have preferred more performance–pay sensitivity. Such a preference could have been the 
result of the increased acceptance of such practices noted above, or, since preferences for 
and perceptions of risk may vary across individuals (Pablo, 1997; Sanders, 2001), it could 
 at Erasmus Univ Rotterdam on November 27, 2012jom.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
22   Journal of Management / Month XXXX Takeuchi / Expatriate Adjustment  22
have been the result of some executives preferring riskier arrangements or misperceiving the 
riskiness of their arrangements.
Yet another explanation for the observed variation in the settings where CEOs and 
directors seem to be able to wield power could lie in the very nature of negotiation itself. 
Given that both executives and directors want to achieve their objectives but may not be able 
to obtain everything they seek, the ultimate result may be that although powerful CEOs end 
up with higher pay levels, they have to accept that their pay is to some extent at risk and 
more sensitive to performance. This may reflect a payoff in which executives are compensated 
for taking on other forms of riskier compensation and indicate that executives and directors 
arrive at solutions in which they both realize some of their objectives.9
Ultimately, our data do not allow us to adjudicate between these and other possible 
explanations, but the findings highlight the necessity of future research to pay close 
attention to analyzing the influence of managerial and director power on different types of 
pay, the preferences of different parties for different forms of pay, and the ratio of pay at 
risk to total compensation as a dependent variable. The latter would also allow us to better 
understand the relative importance and implications of pay at risk, which remain understudied 
(Murphy, 1999).
It is important to note the results that diverge from our primary interpretation. Board 
power measured by board independence, for example, is influential only in the case of 
performance–pay sensitivities. More independent boards appear to strengthen performance–
pay relationships, but they do not appear to be able to limit the level of cash compensation, 
nor increase the level of LTIPs. One possible explanation is that independence may be an 
imprecise measure of board power. Independent directors, for example, may be prone to 
CEO influence because of the role of CEOs in director selection, the bonds of shared 
interests and collegiality among board members, and their dependence on executives for 
information (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). In addition, independent directors are often outsiders 
who have limited inside information on the firm or on the day-to-day operations of its chief 
executive. For them, the choice between monitoring behavior and rewarding outputs may be 
decided in favor of the latter, as direct monitoring is less practical for them. This highlights 
the need for future research to develop better theoretical conceptualizations and measures 
of board independence.
The findings for CEO tenure also diverge from the overall pattern. Tenure is negatively 
associated with levels of LTIPs and lower performance–pay sensitivity, contrary to our main 
findings that powerful CEOs have a difficult time negotiating for exactly these outcomes. A 
reasonable interpretation of this is that CEOs with longer tenure are closer to retirement and 
that boards recognize this and may reduce longer-term incentives, focusing more on cash 
and shorter term incentives (Nourayi & Mintz, 2008). This may also explain why we do not 
find a significant positive association between CEO tenure and total compensation but do 
find a significant positive association with total cash compensation. Another explanation 
could be that CEO power increases cash compensation because extended tenure prevents 
CEOs from receiving higher pay that is associated with the premiums paid by hiring firms 
to motivate CEOs to give up their firm-specific human capital and take on the risk of moving 
to another firm where they lack this kind of capital (Harris & Helfat, 1997).
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Limitations and Other Avenues for Future Research
Obviously, our analysis has limitations, the most important of which are related to available 
research on executive compensation and to our analytical approach. The first is the somewhat 
problematic interpretation of certain indicators as proxies for managerial or director power. 
Most research has focused on formal board attributes, ownership structures, and CEO 
characteristics as measures of relative managerial power. These measures are much easier to 
observe than others that might have more validity, such as the actual decision-making 
processes of boards and how CEOs might actually influence these decisions. Although some 
research has moved beyond collecting and analyzing easily accessible secondary data by 
collecting primary data (e.g., O’Reilly & Main, 2010; Westphal & Stern, 2007) and by 
combining these with secondary data (e.g., McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008), clearly 
much work remains to be done.
A related criticism of our approach is that a large study of original data could be a better 
way to test MPT than a meta-analysis. Given the mixed results in primary studies and the 
debates in the literature, however, meta-analysis is an appropriate way to assess the evidence 
from a large group of studies (Dalton et al., 2003; C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994). In addition, 
our meta-analytic assessment allows us also to identify avenues for future research to advance 
our understanding based on the cumulated evidence. Using primary data, however, would 
be another fruitful avenue for testing MPT as well as for identifying other determinants of 
executive compensation and further theory development.
Another limitation of our analysis is that the majority of studies included in our sample 
have relied on data drawn from samples of large U.S. corporations, such as the S&P 500, and 
may not be generalizable beyond this sample (Dalton et al., 2003; Deutsch, 2005). Although 
much of the attention in management, accounting, economic, and finance research has 
focused on this population of large corporations, they actually compose a very small 
percentage of total business enterprises. However, their visibility and size make them an 
important group of organizations for testing theories of corporate governance. An important 
way in which MPT could be extended, however, would be to move beyond this group of firms 
to focus on cross-national variation in institutional and cultural constraints on managerial 
power. This has only recently started to attract the attention of pay researchers (Tosi & 
Greckhamer, 2004) and is clearly missing from most of the literature on MPT.
In addition, to be able to assess our predicted relationships through meta-analysis, we 
required a large enough sample of effect sizes, which naturally limited the number of 
variables we could test. There are likely some measures of managerial power that we could 
not include that would have strengthened our analysis, such as board interlocks. Moreover, 
some researchers have suggested that the relationships between managerial power and CEO 
pay are nonlinear (Devers et al., 2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). Since the number of 
studies investigating these relationships is relatively limited, we were unable to include this 
in our analyses. As such, future research should attend to examining the roles that nonlinear 
relationships and other proxies for power could play in furthering our understanding of the 
links between managerial power and executive compensation outcomes.
Finally, it is important to highlight the relatively small percentage of variance explained 
by indicators of CEO and board power. Our findings show that firm size is far more important 
for explaining CEO compensation (Tosi et al., 2000). Relative to significant indicators of 
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CEO and board power, the mean correlation between CEO total compensation and firm size 
is about 2 to 14 times higher, depending on the indicator. Overall, MPT indicators show a 
modest relationship with CEO total compensation and performance–pay sensitivity. Our 
findings are, however, in line with other meta-analyses that find that board and ownership 
structures do not explain a great deal of variance in firm strategy (Deutsch, 2005; van Essen 
et al., in press) and firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2003; Heugens 
et al., 2009; van Essen et al., in press). Finally, other meta-analyses have found similar results 
for the influence of CEO duality on strategy (van Essen et al., in press) and firm performance 
(Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2001).
Conclusion
Research on executive compensation continues to be divided along disciplinary lines 
regarding whether pay is set through optimal contracting arrangements or whether managerial 
power over directors compromises these arrangements. The meta-analytic evidence presented 
here represents strong evidence that managers can and do influence their pay arrangements and 
that their power can be constrained by shareholders and their agents. However, the results 
are also clear that MPT does not provide a single unifying explanation for all executive 
compensation outcomes, particularly regarding arrangements that link pay to performance. In 
these cases, directors appear to have the upper hand over powerful CEOs. Managerial power, 
therefore, has an important influence over the pay-setting process, but optimal contracting 
arrangements may also exist. MPT and optimal contracting, therefore, do not represent 
competing explanations but describe points on a continuum of types of contracting arrangements 
that can be encompassed within agency theory. We hope that the evidence presented here helps 
other scholars move debates about the determinants of executive compensation away from 
stylized representations of MPT and optimal contracting to more nuanced and multidisciplinary 
approaches that pay careful attention to measuring the phenomena of interest. Indeed, research 
designs that permit more precise measurement of executive influence over the pay-setting 
process (e.g., O’Reilly & Main, 2010) can help us develop a more expansive theory of agency 
(Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Gomez-Mejia, in press). Ultimately, the research to date 
shows that MPT represents one such useful expansion of agency theory.
Appendix A
Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis
Author Year Publication
Agarwal 1981 IR
Agrawal and Knoeber 1998 JFE
Ahn and Han 2008 WP
Al-Shammari 2008 WP
Anderson, Becher, and Campbell 2004 JFI
Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran 1999 WP
Ang, Lauterbach, and Schreiber 2002 JBF
Angbazo and Narayanan 1997 EFR
Ashley and Yang 2004 JBE
Attaway 2000 ABR
Baber, Kang, and Kumar 1998 JAE
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Appendix A (continued)
Author Year Publication
Baber, Kang, and Kumar 1999 AR
Baber, Kang, and Liang 2006 WP
Baecker 2008 CH
Baker, Collins, and Reitenga 2002 WP
Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia 2000 AMJ
Banning 2004 COC
Banning and Chiles 2007 JLR
Barro and Barro 1990 JLE
Bartkus, Morris, and Seifert 2002 BS
Beatty and Zajac 1994 ASQ
Bebchuk and Grinstein 2007 WP
Belliveau, O’Reilly, and Wade 1996 AMJ
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009 AMJ
Bhattacharyya, Mawani, and Morrill 2008 AF
Bilimoria 1997 HR
Bliss and Rosen 2001 JFE
Boschen, Duru, Gordon, and Smith 2003 AR
Boumosleh 2008 WP
Bovie 2008 WP
Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2003 WP
Boyd 1994 SMJ
Brander 2006 JBE
Brick, Palmon, and Wald 2006 JCF
Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien 2000 JB
Bryan and Klein 2004 WP
Buchholtz, Young, and Powell 1998 GOM
Byrd and Hickman 1995 MF
Campbell, Johnston, Sefcik, and Soderstrom 2007 JAPP
Carpenter 2000 JM
Carpenter and Sanders 2004 JM
Carpenter, Sanders, and Gregersen 2001 AMJ
Carpenter and Seo 2004 WP
Carr 1997 JSBM
Carter, Lynch, and Tuna 2007 AR
Certo, Daily, Cannella, and Dalton 2003 AMJ
Cheng 2004 AR
Cheng, Collins, and Huang 2006 WP
Cheng and Indjejikian 2009 IRLE
Ciscel 1974 SEJ
Ciscel and Carroll 1980 RES
Collins, Reitenga, and Sanchez-Cuevas, 2004 WP
Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, and Donahue 2007 JMS
Conyon 2006 AMP
Conyon, Peck, and Sadler 2009 AMP
Coombs and Gilley 2005 SMJ
Cordeiro 2005 WP
Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003 ABR
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999 JFE
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton 1998 AMJ
David, Hitt, and Gimeno 2001 AMJ
David, Kochhar, and Levitas 1998 AMJ
Davidson, Xie, Xu, and Ning 2007 JMG
Davila and Penalva 2006 RAS
Davila and Venkatachalam 2004 RAS
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Deckop 1988 ILRR
Deckop, Merriman, and Gupta 2006 JM
Deutsch, Keil, and Laamanen 2007 JM
Dikolli, Kulp, and Sedatole 2005 WP
Dorata and Petra 2008 MF
Duru and Reeb 2002 JAAF
Duru and Smith 2001 WP
Elhagrasey, Harrison, and Buchholz 1999 JMG
Elyasiani and Jia 2007 WP
Ertugrul, Sezer, and Sirmans 2008 JREFE
Fahlenbrach 2008 RF
Feng, Gramlich, and Gupta 2006 WP
Fich and Slezak 2008 RQFA
Finkelstein and Boyd 1998 AMJ
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989 SMJ
Frey, Nelling, and Webb 2006 CGIR
Garvey and Milbourn 2003 JF
Garvey and Milbourn 2006 JFE
Geiger and Cashen 2007 JMI
Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein 2001 SMJ
Ghosh and Sirmans 2005 JREFE
Gibbons and Murphy 1990 ILRR
Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri 2003 AMJ
Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin 1987 AMJ
Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, and Dharwadkar 2007 SMJ
Gottesman and Morey 2006 WP
Gray and Cannella 1997 JM
Grossman and Cannella 2006 JM
Hall and Liebman 1998 QJE
Hallock 1997 JFQA
Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995 SMJ
Harjoto and Mullineaux 2003 JFR
Harris and Helfat 1997 SMJ
Haushalter 2000 JF
He 2008 JBV
He 2008 WP
Hebner and Kato 1997 IREF
Henderson and Fredrickson 1996 AMJ
Henderson and Fredrickson 2001 AMJ
Hill and Phan 1991 AMJ
Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton 2008 WP
Hogan and McPheters 1980 SEJ
Houston and James 1995 JME
Hubbard and Palia 1995 JFE
Iyengar and Zampelli 2008 AF
Jackson, Lopez, and Reitenga 2008 JAPP
Jalbert, Chan, Jalbert, and Landry 2007 JDM
Jensen and Murphy 1990 JPE
Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson 2005 JESF
Joyce 2001 ABR
Kacperczyck 2007 WP
Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Mathieu 2004 WP
Kaplan 1994 JPE
Kato and Rockel 1992 JJIE
Kerr and Bettis 1987 AMJ
Kerr and Kren 1992 AMJ
Khan, Dharwadkar, and Brandes 2005 JBR
Kim 2000 DIS
Kim 2005 DIS
Kren and Kerr 1997 AB
Kruse and Rennie 2006 WP
Kumar, Ghicas, and Pastena 1993 MF
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Larcker, Richardson, Seary, and Tuna 2005 WP
Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, and 
Welbourne
2007 SMJ
Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman 2006 JAE
Lewellen 2003 WP
Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum 1992 MDE
Madanoglu and Karadag 2008 JFBR
Magnan and Stonge 1997 SMJ
Main, O’Reilly, and Wade 1995 ICC
Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia 2006 SMJ
Mangel and Singh 1993 AB
Martin and Thomas 2005 JCF
Matta and Beamish 2008 SMJ
McClelland and Barker 2007 WP
McDonald, Khanna, and Westphal 2008 AMJ
McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing 1962 AER
McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd 2003 JBE
Mehran 1992 JFQA
Meyer and Elayan 2005 WP
Miller 1995 AMJ
Miller, Wiseman, and Gomez-Mejia 2002 AMJ
Mir and Seboui 2008 CG
Mitsudome, Weintrop, and Hwang 2008 JJIE
Moeller 2005 JFE
Mohan 2004 WP
Murphy 1986 RJE
Ning, Hu, and Garza-Gomez 2009 WP
Noguera and Highfield 2006 WP
Nourayi and Daroca 2008 MF
Nourayi and Mintz 2008 MF
Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin 2006 CAR
Offstein and Gnyawali 2005 JETM
Offstein and Gnyawali 2005 JMP
O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal 1988 ASQ
Otten and Heugens 2008 WP
Pathak, Hoskisson, and Johnson 2008 WP
Pennathur and Shelor 2002 JREFE
Pollock, Fischer, and Wade 2002 AMJ
Porac, Wade, and Pollock 1999 ASQ
Rajagopalan and Finkelstein 1992 SMJ
Reeb and Upadhyay 2006 WP
Reeb and Upadhyay 2007 WP
Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik 1993 MF
Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur 1993 MF
Rose 2005 CGIR
Roulstone 2003 JAR
Sanders 1999 MF
Sanders 2001 AMJ
Sanders and Carpenter 1998 AMJ
Sanders and Carpenter 2003 AMJ
Sanders and Hambrick 2008 AMJ
Schaefer 1998 RES
Schnatterly 2003 SMJ
Seo and Carpenter 2008 WP
Sheikh 2001 WP
Sheikholeslami 2001 ABR
Shim and Lee 2003 RAF
Shortridge and Avila 2004 RMIR
Sigler 2003 MRN
Sigler and Haley 1995 MF
Sloan 1993 JAE
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Smith and Swan 2008 WP
Srinivasan, Sayrak, and Nagarajan 2004 WP
Stanwick and Stanwick 2001 BSE
Staw and Epstein 2000 ASQ
Sung and Swan 2008 WP
Talmor and Wallace 2001 WP
Tinaikar 2006 WP
Tinaikar 2008 WP
Tobler 2006 WP
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989 ASQ
Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, and Yammarino 2004 LQ
Tripp and Kenny 1995 ABR
Vafeas 2003 FM
Vafeas and Afxentiou 1998 JAPP
Van der Laan, van Ees, and van Witteloostuijn 2008 WP
Veliyath 1999 JMS
Veliyath and Bishop 1995 IJOA
Wade, Porac, and Pollock 1997 JOB
Wade, Porac, Pollock, and Graffin 2006 AMJ
Wann 2003 WP
Weber 2004 DIS
Westphal 1999 AMJ
Westphal and Zajac 1994 ASQ
Westphal and Zajac 1995 ASQ
Winfrey and Logan 1998 CRR
Wright and Kroll 2002 JMG
Wright, Kroll, Lado, and van Ness 2002 SMJ
Wu and Tu 2007 JBR
Young and Buchholtz 2002 JMI
Zajac and Westphal 1994 SMJ
Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, and Khanin 2008 AMJ
Zhou 2006 WP
Note: AB = Accounting & Business Research; ABR = American Business Review; AER = American Economic Review; AF = Accounting 
and Finance; AMJ = Academy of Management Journal; AMP = Academy of Management Perspective; AR = Accounting Review; ASQ = 
Administrative Science Quarterly; BS = Business Society; BSE = Business Strategy and the Environment; CAR = Contemporary 
Accounting Research; CG = Corporate Governance; CGIR = Corporate Governance—An International Review; CH = book chapter; 
COC = Corporate Ownership & Control; CRR = Corporate Reputation Review; DIS = dissertation; EFR = European Finance Review; 
FM = Financial Management; GOM = Group & Organization Management; HR = Human Relations; ICC = Industrial and Corporate 
Change; IJOA = International Journal of Organizational Analysis; ILRR = Industrial and Labor Relations Review; IR = Industrial 
Relations; IREF = International Review of Economics and Finance; IRLE = International Review of Law and Economics; JAAF = 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance; JAE = Journal of Accounting and Economics; JAPP = Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy; JAR = Journal of Accounting Research; JB = Journal of Business; JBE = Journal of Business Ethics; JBF = Journal of Banking 
& Finance; JBR = Journal of Business Research; JBV = Journal of Business Venturing; JCF = Journal of Corporate Finance; JDM = 
Journal of Diversity Management; JESF = Journal of Economics and Finance; JETM = Journal of Engineering and Technology 
Management; JF = Journal of Finance; JFBR = Journal of Foodservice Business Research; JFE = Journal of Financial Economics; JFI 
= Journal of Financial Intermediation; JFQA = Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; JFR = Journal of Financial Research; 
JJIE = Journal of the Japanese and International Economies; JLE = Journal of Labor Economics; JLR = Journal of Labor Research; JM 
= Journal of Management; JME = Journal of Monetary Economics; JMG = Journal of Management and Governance; JMI = Journal of 
Managerial Issues; JMP = Journal of Managerial Psychology; JMS = Journal of Management Studies; JOB = Journal of Organizational 
Behavior; JPE = Journal of Political Economy; JREFE = Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics; JSBM = Journal of Small 
Business Management; LQ = Leadership Quarterly; MDE = Managerial and Decision Economics; MF = Managerial Finance; MRN = 
Management Research News; QJE = Quarterly Journal of Economics; RAF = Review of Accounting and Finance; RAS = Review of 
Accounting Studies; RES = Review of Economics and Statistics; RF = Review of Finance; RJE = RAND Journal of Economics; RMIR = 
Risk Management and Insurance Review; RQFA = Review of Quantitative Financial and Accounting; SEJ = Southern Economic Journal; 
SMJ = Strategic Management Journal; TM = Tourism Management; WP = working paper.
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Appendix F
Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Modeling Results, CEO Total 
Cash and CEO LTIP
CEO Total Cash CEO LTIP
Predictors b t B t
CEO duality .10** 11.73 .03** 3.29
CEO tenure .06** 6.84 –.03** –2.95
Board size .15** 17.01 .13** 12.86
Board independence –.01 –0.97 –.03** –2.72
Ownership concentration –.04** –4.75 .06** 6.01
Institutional ownership –.01 –1.48 .07** 7.47
Firm performance .15** 17.99 .07** 7.68
Firm size .27** 31.10 .14** 14.29
Firm debt level .04** 4.33 –.04** –4.02
Firm diversification .04** 4.81 .05** 5.59
Firm risk .05** 5.94 .09** 9.27
Firm R&D level .12** 13.78 .05** 5.31
CEO age .05** 5.40 –.11** –11.11
Inside ownership –.09** –11.03 –.07** –7.58
Harmonic mean N 11,360
c2 1,433.50
RMSEA .091
RMSR .033
**p < .01.
νˆ
Notes
1. Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as  where r is the untransformed 
correlation coefficient.
2. In Hedges and Olkin–type meta-analyses (HOMA), there are two methods for combining study estimates. 
The first method utilizes a fixed effects model, which assumes the absence of heterogeneity between study results. 
In fixed effects HOMA, the collected effect sizes are solely corrected for sampling error, under the assumption that 
differences in sample size are the sole driver of variability between effect sizes. The second method employs random 
effects models and is currently favored by the meta-analytic community (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Attractively, 
random effects HOMA is more conservative than fixed effects HOMA when effect size distributions are 
heterogeneous, but both methods yield materially similar results when the distribution is homogeneous (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001). The random effects method assumes that studies are estimating different effect sizes, which are 
corrected for sampling error, plus a value that represents other sources of variability, which are in turn assumed to 
be randomly distributed. In short, we opt for random effect HOMA.
3. w is calculated as  ,where SE is the standard error of the effect size and    is the random effects
 
variance component, which is in turn calculated as and the formula of random effect variance is
z
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4. The meta-analytic mean is calculated as     with its standards error as   
and with its 95% confidence interval computed as 
5. Partial correlations are computed as √(t2/ (t2+df)), where t is the t-statistic and df is the degrees of freedom. 
Note that this will always produce a positive number, so it is necessary to convert it to a negative number if the 
regression coefficient is negative (see Greene, 2008: chap. 3). t-values result from the scaling of primary coefficients 
by their respective standard errors. They are by definition standardized and defined on a dimensionless scale.
6. The problem of endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is correlated with the error term in a 
regression model, or when the dependent variable (i.e., the executive compensation measure) simultaneously affects 
the independent variable (i.e., firm performance). There are several accepted methods of controlling for endogeneity. 
Endogeneity-conscious researchers usually use a fixed or random effects panel data model and calculate 
instrumental variables using two- or three-stages least squares or the generalized method of moments (Sánchez-
Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007).
7. The Q test is computed by summing the squared deviations of each study’s effect estimate from the overall 
effect estimate. In this exercise, each study is weighted by its w. The Q test assumes homogeneity, following a chi-
square distribution with k – 1 degrees of freedom (k = the number of studies). When Q is significant, as it is in our 
case most of the time, the assumption of homogeneity is rejected. This implies that the overall mean correlation 
reported here has to be interpreted as an average rather than a common true correlation value (Hedges & Olkin, 
1985: 235), meaning that the associational strength of the focal relationship varies significantly and requires further 
mediation and moderator analyses. Therefore, we use more advanced meta-analytic structural equation modeling 
(MASEM) and meta-analytic regression analyses (MARA) techniques to test our hypotheses.
8. The robustness checks we performed consisted of different HOMA analyses on subgroups of our data that (a) 
consisted of primary studies that had nonoverlapping time periods, and (b) we split the total sample by particular 
sources of compensation data, including only the largest nonoverlapping samples. More specifically, when two or more 
samples included overlapping firm-year observations, we retained only the largest sample and excluded the smaller 
one(s). The results of these robustness checks are not reported here because of space constraints but are available on 
request. The HOMA results for the different pay components in relation to form size are also available on request.
9. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this alternative explanation.
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